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WHAT SHOULD THE LAW SAY ABOUT DISCLOSURE OF
GENETIC INFORMATION TO RELATIVES?
ELLEN WRIGHT CLAYTrON, MD, JD*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person is diagnosed with a genetic disease or characteris-
tic, his or her relatives are more likely than others in the general pop-
ulation to be similarly affected. This fact raises a host of questions.
What should these relatives be told about the chance that they, too,
inherited a particular mutation? If they should be told, who should
tell them? What weight should be given to protecting patient confi-
dentiality? The increasing availability of interventions that can ame-
liorate or even eliminate the symptoms of genetic disorders makes
these questions more pressing. In this paper, I will assume, as an ethi-
cal matter, that patients should generally tell their relatives about the
chance that they, too, inherited a treatable genetic disorder. I will
assume, also, that there may be instances in which clinicians are per-
mitted by ethical norms to warn patients' relatives about the chance
that they inherited a treatable disorder even over the patients' express
objections. I will argue, however, that using the law of negligence to
enforce such proposed obligations would represent an unwarranted
expansion of legal duty and would entail great costs to the delivery of
health care.
II. RELATIVES' DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE-AM I MY SIBLING'S KEEPER?
Let me begin by looking first at a topic that has received little
discussion in the law,1 namely disclosure within families. The follow-
ing hypothetical illustrates some of the problems.
Tom, who is in his mid-30s, has colon cancer, as did his father and
paternal aunt. Tom's surgeon, Dr. Smart, appropriately recognizes
that Tom may have a mutation that predisposed him to develop co-
lon cancer and tells Tom that his siblings and his cousins on his
father's side may also have such mutations. He recommends that
* Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
Schools of Medicine and Law. The author would like to thank John Goldberg for his
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. But see generally Sonia Suter, Whose Genes are These Anyway? Familial Conflict over Ac-
cess to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REx-. 1854 (1993).
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Tom talk with these relatives so that they can begin routine colonos-
copy to try to detect cancer or premalignant changes at an earlier,
and hence more curable, stage. Tom, however, decides not to tell his
siblings and cousins. His cousin, Sue, develops rectal bleeding two
years later and is found to have colon cancer, which had metasta-
sized by the time it was discovered.
Should Sue be able to obtain damages for negligence from Tom?
This bare hypothetical calls out for more detail. Why didn't Tom talk
with his relatives? Was he embarrassed because he has cancer? Per-
haps he has a colostomy2 and is embarrassed about that. Was he sim-
ply too distracted by his own concerns? Was he worried that his
brother, Joe, who was unemployed at the time of Tom's surgery,
would not be able to get health insurance if Tom told him or other
family members what was going on?3 Or maybe his sister, Ann, was
getting married, and he did not want to cast a pall over her happy
event. Maybe Tom believes that the risk of heritable cancer is worth
talking about only if he knows for sure that he has a mutation, and he
did not know about or did not want to have the test. Had Tom had a
falling out with his family and decided not to tell them out of spite?
Maybe they had just grown apart. Tom might have had any number
of reasons for not talking with his relatives. If his story is typical, more
than one reason applies.
But learning more about why Tom held his tongue really does
not help us very much in deciding whether Sue should be able to get
damages from Tom. For purposes of discussion, let us assume that
Sue can show that she and Tom in fact shared a mutation that predis-
posed them to develop colon cancer, that a judge and jury would find
that a reasonable person in Tom's position would have disclosed the
information to Sue, that Sue and the mythic reasonable person would
have sought health care earlier than she did and would have had the
recommended colonoscopy,4 that her cancer would have been discov-
2. A colostomy is "an artificial opening created in the large intestine and brought to
the surface of the abdomen for the purpose of evacuating the bowels." MILLER-KEANE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 333 (5th ed. 1992). A
colonoscopy is an "endoscopic examination of the colon, either transabdominally during
laparotomy, or transanally by means of a colonoscope." Id.
3. Exploring the impact of genetic information on access to health insurance is be-
yond the scope of this paper except to say that the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act, Pub. Law No. 104-191, did not solve all the problems. See, e.g., Karen H.
Rothenberg, Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: A Call for Legislative Action, 52 J. AM.
MED. WOMEN'S Ass'N 43 (1997); Robert Pear, Health Insurers Skirting New Law, Officials Re-
port, N.Y. TIMES, October 5, 1997, at A6.
4. Although I will argue below that the doctrine of informed consent does not extend
easily to the problems addressed in this paper, many courts addressing these problems may
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ered before it had spread had she had this procedure, and that sur-
gery in that case would have been curative. This is a formidable chain
of causation which must be forged before liability could be imposed.
But the question I want to focus on is whether Sue can show that Tom
had a legally enforceable duty to warn her about her possible genetic
predisposition to develop colon cancer.
A number of arguments can be made in favor of imposing such a
duty on Tom. For much of this century, foreseeability has been a ma-
jor determinant of the scope of duty in negligence law, and it is cer-
tainly foreseeable that people who have mutations that predispose
them to develop colon cancer and who do not undergo rather aggres-
sive screening have a high chance of developing invasive disease.5
One might also turn to the recent body of cases that have imposed
liability on a person who gives a sexually transmitted disease, such as
genital herpes, HIV, or condylomata, to another.6 Some courts have
supported their finding of a duty in this setting by stating, "after all, it
is not that much of a burden to have to disclose a risk to a potential
sexual partner."7
One can, of course, argue that the reasoning of the infectious
disease cases does not support imposing liability on patients who fail
to warn their relatives of possible shared genetic risks. A closer look
reveals that most of the recent infectious disease cases that impose
well import from such cases as Canterbury v. Spence the requirement that both objective and
subjective causation be shown. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury the court
found that in the context of a suit claiming inadequate disclosure of risk information by a
physician, causation should be determined by looking objectively to whether a reasonably
prudent person would have sought treatment if informed of potential risk factors in addi-
tion to looking at the plaintiff's subjective testimony after the fact. See id. at 791. In some
states, however, a patient would need to show only that she would have sought health care
and pursued screening. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussion on informed
consent).
5. See generally Malcom G. Dunlop et al., Cancer Risk Associated with Germline DNA Mis-
match Repair Gene Mutations, 6 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 105 (1997) (estimating that 74%
of males and 30% of females with mutations in hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer
(HNPCC) genes will develop colorectal cancer during their lifetime); Gloria M. Petersen,
Knowledge of the Adenomatosis Polyposis Coli Gene and Its Clinical Application, 26 ANNALS MED.
205 (1994) (determining that of the more than 90% of mutation carriers who develop
polyps, virtually all will develop colon cancer if untreated).
6. See, e.g., Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229 (La. 1994); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d
645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Although courts do not always keep them separate, the cases
that impose liability on a patient who gives a disease to another raise different concerns
than the cases imposing liability on physicians who fail to warn the infectious patient's
contacts. See infra notes 9-16, 35-39 and accompanying text.
7. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1392 (W.D. Mich. 1993); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428
N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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liability on patients involve sexually transmitted diseases (STD).'
These decisions, while frequently couched in terms of the foreseeable
need to protect others9 - a rationale that would support far reaching
liability - often rely as well on other factors that limit the general-
izability of their holdings. In many of these cases, the defendant got
the STD as the result of sexual indiscretions (there is a high rate of
marital infidelity and/or promiscuity in these cases)." The courts
seem to feel that after such "bad" deeds, it is particularly wrong to
make another person, particularly one's spouse, run the risk of infec-
tion by having sex with them." The STD cases begin to look more
like cases finding wanton and willful negligence12 than cases imposing
liability on inattentive drivers who run into someone. Other courts
hold that one owes a higher duty of care, approaching a fiduciary obli-
gation of full and fair disclosure, to one's sexual partner.13 Still other
8. See, e.g., Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1389 (alleging that male sex partner wrongfully
transmitted HIV to female plaintiff and her infant child); Meany, 639 So.2d at 231 (claim-
ing that former husband negligently infected former wife with viruses which caused genital
herpes and venereal warts); M.M.D., 467 N.W.2d at 646 (claiming negligent infection of
genital warts); RAP., 428 N.W.2d at 106 (claiming that wife had negligently infected hus-
band with genital herpes); G.L. v. M.L., 550 A.2d 525, 526 (N.J. App. 1988) (alleging per-
sonal injury of wife as a result of husband's alleged transmission of genital herpes to her);
Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (claiming husband
negligently infected wife with incurable genital herpes); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d
265, 266 (Ohio 1989) (alleging that wife's paramour was negligent in failing to notify wife
that paramour was at risk of passing venereal disease on to wife).
9. See, e.g., Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1394 (finding "as a matter of law" that it "was not
foreseeable that he [defendant] would pass the HIV virus to Ms. Doe [plaintiff] simply
because he [defendant] had unprotected sex with multiple partners prior to his encounter
with Ms. Doe."); RA.P., 428 N.W.2d at 107-08 (indicating that people with genital herpes
are in a position to foresee potential injury to others thereby imposing on such persons a
duty of reasonable care).
10. See, e.g., Meany, 639 So.2d at 231 (alleging that former wife's infection with herpes
occurred after reconciliation with her husband, who had engaged in multiple extramarital
affairs for which he could not testify with certainty that protective devices were used).
11. See, e.g., RA.P., 428 N.W.2d 103; G.L., 550 A.2d 525 (rejecting defense of marital
privilege); Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104. One can hypothesize that some of these cases are
driven primarily by anger at the infidelity, for which there are fewer and fewer legal reme-
dies given the growing disfavor with "heartbalm" suits. Some courts, in fact, have gone out
of their way to say that these are not hearthalm cases. See Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 274.
12. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 34, at 213
(5th ed. 1984). ("The usual meaning assigned to 'willful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless,' . . . is that
the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a
known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow and which this is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the conse-
quences." (citations omitted)).
13. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(extending prior cases that imposed liability when one spouse infected another, saying "a
certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any intimate relationship, at least to the
extent that one sexual partner represents to the other that he or she is free from venereal
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courts rest their finding of a duty, at least in part, on the existence of
state statutes that impose criminal penalties on those who transmit
sexually transmitted diseases.' 4 One question then is whether Tom's
failure to warn his relatives is morally culpable enough to be seen as
sharing the wages of sin or breaching a fiduciary duty.
Failure to warn about infectious disease differs from failing to dis-
close genetic risks in other ways as well. In the infectious disease
cases, the potential plaintiff was healthy and only became sick as a
result of exposure to the infected individual. The courts often say,
therefore, that the infected person created a risk for the people who
become infected by exposure.15 In addition, in most of these cases,
the infected people were doing something potentially dangerous,
such as engaging in unprotected sex, for their own purposes and so
exposed others to harm.16
By contrast, in the genetics cases, the relative who has the predis-
posing mutation is already at risk to develop the disease. All the af-
fected individual, or the proband, can do is to warn his relatives about
the risk so they can engage in prevention or early intervention. When
looked at in this way, Sue's case begins to look more like a rescue case
- she was at risk, and Tom did not try to save her.
What guidance can be derived from the rescue cases? The gen-
eral rule in the United States is that one person does not have a duty
to rescue another unless the potential rescuer either created the risk17
(e.g., he pushed someone whom he knew could not swim into a deep
lake) or had a special relationship to the potential victim (e.g., he was
a lifeguard who was hired to protect people in the lake),." If a by-
or other dangerous contagious disease"). But see Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1393 (holding
that no special duties arise from a "single consensual sexual encounter between two
adults").
14. See Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d
404 (Fla. App. 1991) (discussing an Alabama statute which makes any person found to
have knowingly transmitted a sexually transmitted disease to another person guilty of a
class C misdemeanor); Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (discussing a New York statute which
makes persons who, knowing themselves to be infected with an infectious disease, have
sexual intercourse with another, guilty of a misdemeanor). One might argue, for example,
that violation of such a statute is negligence per se although most courts to date have
hesitated to go this far.
15. See, e.g.,Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1393; Kathleen K., 198 Cal. App. 3d at 996-98.
16. See, e.g., Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1385.
17. See Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (Ill. 1996) (com-
mon law generally imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon one who did not
cause the injury in the first place.).
18. See S & C Company v. Home, 235 S.E.2d 456, 459 (Va. 1977) (describing a life-
guard's duty as a twofold process of observing swimmers for signs of distress and attempt-
ing rescue at some point of those in distress).
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stander who was an Olympic swimmer stood by the lake and know-
ingly watched the victim drown, we might think him immoral, but he
would not be liable to the victim's estate for damages. The law of
rescue is one of the few areas of the law of negligence where courts
remain more likely to impose liability for acts that cause injury than
for omissions.1 9
In the case in which Tom fails to tell Sue about her genetic risk,
Tom did not push Sue into the lake - she was already there. The
question then becomes whether he had a special relationship with her
that required him to help her out? Analysis of prior precedent would
suggest that being a blood relative is not sufficient by itself to support
the imposition of special obligations. Siblings and cousins sue each
other all the time, and courts have not been willing to require, for
example, one sibling to exercise special care with regard to another
unless the one sibling had some special role external to the family that
itself required a particular standard of care.2° Thus, the only lawyer in
the family who draws up a will for his parents that cuts out all his
siblings can be held liable for exerting undue influence.2" But for the
most part, the law tends to regard relationships between all relatives
except parents and children, and husband and wife as being at arm's
length.22
But can one successfully argue that more is required between rel-
atives in this situation because there is something special about risks
to health that matters more than fighting about money? Consider the
following hypothetical:
Mark becomes ill with cancer, which he discovers is due to toxic
fumes seeping into his house from the ground. These fumes can be
completely eliminated by applying a special sealant to the walls in his
basement, which he does. He does not want to sell his house because
he likes it and because he really does not feel up to moving. He also
does not want to tell his neighbors about this risk even though their
houses may have this same problem. Perhaps hefears they will move
which would make him sad. He is particularly concerned that his
19. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1909).
20. See, e.g., Holtschneider v. Stratman, 655 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. App. 1983).
21. See Richland County Bar Ass'n v. Gibson, 654 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio 1995) (imposing a
two year suspension on an attorney who neglected to disclose a conflict of interest regard-
ing his control of the family business); cf, Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1993)
(refusing to impose liability on brother-in-law attorney because he had made full and fair
disclosure of possible conflicts).
22. See, e.g., Holtschneider, 655 S.W.2d at 49 (holding that a "confidential relationship"
comparable to a fiduciary did not exist among siblings).
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brother, Jack, who lives just down the street and whom he sees every
day might leave. Perhaps he is also worried that the value of his
property will go down, possibly precipitously, if news of these toxic
fumes gets around. Two years later, Jack also develops the same type
of cancer for the same reason. Jack subsequently finds out what
Mark knew and wants to sue Mark.
Here as well, Mark failed to "rescue" Jack. Let us suppose that the risk
of harm from their shared environmental hazard is as large as the risk
posed by the mutation that Tom and Sue may share. In this scenario,
few would propose that Mark had a legally enforceable duty to warn
Jack.2" The same analysis may well apply to Tom and Sue and their
shared genetic predisposition to colon cancer.2 4 Both factors contrib-
ute to the development of disease. Imposing liability only for failure
to disclose genetic risks may foster the view that these factors are
somehow worse, a result which many commentators who criticize no-
tions of "genetic exceptionalism" seek to avoid.2"
The Special Case of Parents
Let us embellish our original hypothetical a little further and sup-
pose that
Tom has a daughter, Jane, who several years after Tom's diagnosis
and successful treatment of colon cancer has now grown to adult-
hood herself She, too, develops rectal bleeding and is diagnosed with
metastatic colon cancer. While she had known that her father was
23. In fact, even sellers of property generally are not required to inform potential buy-
ers about environmental hazards, following the ancient rule of caveat emptor. See, e.g.,
NBD Bank v. Krueger Ringer, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ill. App. 1997); Hydro-Manufac-
turing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 955 (R-I. 1994). But see, Newhall Land &
Farming Co. v. Superior Court (Mobil Oil Corp), 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 385-86 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (rejecting the common law rule of caveat emptor).
24. Environmental risks can be shared by nonrelatives as well. Should this change this
analysis? Let us suppose that Jack had simply been Mark's neighbor and best friend. One
might argue that Mark has even less of an obligation in that setting, reasoning that relatives
owe greater care to each other than do friends. Cultural norms in many communities
would say that this is true. Adopting a blanket rule that one owes less to one's friends and
neighbors than to one's relatives would have bad consequences. For many people, rela-
tionships of friendship are more important than those of blood. Moreover, life in our
society requires that one build and rely on relationships that extend beyond one's blood
kin. It is undesirable to impose a duty to warn relatives but not one's close friends or
neighbors of environmental risks, and as a result, neither should be the beneficiaries of a
legally enforceable duty to warn.
25. See generally RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH, How GE-
NETIC INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS,
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAw ENFORCERS (1993); Lippman, Prenatal Genetic
Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 Am. J.L. & MED. 15
(1991).
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very sick when she was a child, she did not learn until after her own
diagnosis about the nature of her father's disease and about her own
substantially increased risk of being similarly affected. Jane is furi-
ous with her father and wants to sue him for damages.
Her attorney might attempt to rely on the infectious disease
cases, 2 6 arguing that Tom should be liable because he exposed her to
the risk by giving her the mutation. The problem with this argument
is that the only way that one can "get" this mutation is by being con-
ceived in the first place. The only way that Jane could have avoided
having the mutation was by not existing at all. This is not the case of
making an otherwise healthy person sick. The more appropriate anal-
ogy here is to the wrongful life cases, 27 in which the plaintiffs assert
that they should never have been born, a cause of action that is widely
disfavored, especially when asserted even hypothetically against one's
parents. 2
8
Jane's lawyer might also argue that Tom had a duty to rescue Jane
by warning her of her risk. This argument is more attractive because
the law clearly recognizes that parents owe special obligations to their
children, analogous to those of rescue. 21 Parents are uniquely re-
quired to provide their children with the necessities of life. It may
take a village to raise a child, but only parents are legally required to
provide food, housing, clothing, and medical care, even if it entails
significant cost in time and money to themselves.3 ° But the law of
child neglect"' is equally clear that these obligations are enforceable
only at the extremes - parents must provide basic nutrition, not cav-
iar; a roof over one's head, not a mansion. Also, parents must ensure
that children receive demonstrably effective medical treatment
needed to avert serious imminent harm, such as antibiotics for menin-
26. See supra note 6.
27. See Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents'Freedom to Have Children with Genetic Differences,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 762 (1995).
28. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) (statute rejecting such claims; passed in
response to dicta in Curlander v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. App.
1980) that children should be able to sue their parents for such damages); Shepherd, supra
note 27, at 762. But see Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5J. LEGAL
MED. 63, 107 (1984).
29. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2131 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.602(d)
(West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.166 (West 1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.140
(Michie 1996); N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-15 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (An-
derson 1994).
31. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN § 6-2131(1). The D.C. Code defines "child neglect" as
"harm to a child's health or welfare that occurs through the failure to provide adequate
food, clothing, shelter, education, or medical care." Id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 1:373
1998] GENETIC DISCLOSURE TO RELATIVES
gitis.32 No state would deem neglectful a parent who failed to talk
with her children about genetic risks. One question is whether a
court would be willing to impose on parents a more far reaching duty
within the law of negligence.
The most basic problem with a child's claim against her parent is
to convince a court not that the parent had a legal duty to disclose,
but rather that the parent should not be immune from liability. Al-
most all states refuse to impose liability on parents for decisions and
actions involved in caring for and rearing children.33 While the scope
of this immunity is not always well defined, parents who argue that
they did not discuss genetic risks with their at-risk child because the
time was not right or their child was likely to be distressed would al-
most surely come within its protection. This is precisely the setting in
which parental immunity ought to apply.34 Jane is angry at her father
right now, but litigation, no matter what its outcome, is likely to set
her anger in stone instead of permitting reconciliation. Moreover,
Tom's failure to talk with Jane was more likely the result of anguished
consideration than simple oversight. His choice, right or wrong, was
at its heart what parents do. In hindsight, Tom almost surely should
have talked with Jane, but permitting her to obtain damages from him
would require a substantial change in the law.
32. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989) (upholding criminal conviction for failure to seek medical attention for child with
meningitis). The courts have been much more reluctant to order onerous treatment that
has only a limited chance of success. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del.
1991) (approving decision of Christian Science parents not to give aggressive chemother-
apy to child with aggressive Burkitt's Lymphoma). These cases almost always involve pa-
rental objection to medical intervention derived from the parents' religious convictions.
33. See, e.g, Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (finding immunity for "exer-
cise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services, and other care"). Some states still provide absolute immunity
for all claims by children of parental negligence. See Warren v. Warren, 650 A.2d 252, 255
(Md. 1994). California is a major exception, rejecting parental immunity and holding that
the "proper test of a parent's conduct is this: what would an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653
(Cal. 1971).
34. The doctrine of parental immunity has come under heavy attack for its origin in
the setting of heinous intentional torts; for the notion that by the time litigation is contem-
plated, harmony no longer exists; for the notion that immunity permits parents to be negli-
gent toward their children; and for the recognition that third party insurance eliminates
economic conflict between the parties. See generally Gibson, 479 P.2d 648. These critiques
do much to explain the erosion that has occurred in parent-child tort immunity, but it is
equally important to recognize that most cases that limit immunity still deal with motor
vehicle accidents rather than decisions such as the ones at issue here.
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III. PHYSICIANS' DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE
The second topic, and the one that has received much more at-
tention over the years, is the question of whether health care provid-
ers are either privileged or required to warn their patients' relatives of
risks that they might face.
Health care providers are in a difficult position. On the one
hand, physicians who care for patients with infectious diseases have
been held liable on numerous occasions over many years for failing to
warn third parties of their risk of contracting the disease. 5 In addi-
tion, in the last thirty years, mental health professionals have been
required to pay damages when their patients have gone out and as-
saulted or killed a person whom they had expressed intentions to
harm during therapy.3 6 One court has even said that physicians must
warn their patients' spouses of shared epidemiologic risks of disease.37
A major problem with imposing on physicians far reaching obli-
gations to warn third parties is that physicians also have strong ethical
requirements to protect patients' confidences, duties that are sup-
ported to varying degrees by different legal rules. Protection of confi-
dentiality is thought to be socially desirable because it promotes open
communication by patients of their complaints, thereby enhancing
the chances of accurate diagnosis, appropriate therapy, and hence the
resumption of the patient's health and contribution to society. Some
courts have held that the need to protect confidentiality outweighs
the rights to third parties to avoid infectious diseases.38 In addition,
individuals can sometimes obtain damages from physicians when pri-
35. See Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. App. 1995)
(holding that a physician was liable to a man who became HIV positive after having sex
with a girl who had not been told by her physicians that she had received infected blood
three years earlier); see also Hofman v. Blackmon, 241 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1970); Skill-
ings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919).
36. The most famous of these cases is Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California. 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a therapist who had knowledge that a patient presented
a serious threat of violence against a third party had a duty to warn the the third party of
the danger); see also Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, 673 N.E.2d
1311 (Ohio 1997) (holding that a psychotherapist whose patient represented a substantial
risk of harm to another person had a duty to exercise "best professional judgment" to
prevent such harm and citing to extensive list of cases).
37. See Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).
38. See Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D. P.R. 1991) (holding that hus-
band had no duty to tell wife that he was infected with HIV because Puerto Rico's courts
had not recognized disclosure of medical information to third parties); Lemon v. Stewart,
682 A.2d 1177 (Md. Ct. Spec, App. 1996) (reasoning that since a physician cannot be held
liable for good faith failure to meet statutory requirements to warn patient's sexual and
needle-sharing partners, he cannot be liable for failing to warn other family members who
were at less risk of becoming infected).
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vate information is disclosed to third parties without their
permission. 9
In the last fifteen years, several groups of commentators have
opined that physicians may ethically disclose genetic risks over their
patients' objections under limited circumstances. The President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research ("President's Commission") rea-
soned that such disclosures over the patient's objection were ethically
defensible only if:
(1) reasonable efforts to elicit voluntary consent to disclo-
sure have failed; (2) there is a high probability both that
harm will occur if the information is withheld and that the
disclosed information will actually be used to avert harm; (3)
the harm that identifiable individuals would suffer would be
serious; and (4) appropriate precautions are taken to ensure
that only the genetic information needed for diagnosis and/
or treatment of the disease in question is disclosed.4"
More recently, the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Assessing Ge-
netic Risks ("IOM Committee") reaffirmed this position, with the ad-
ditional proviso that "the burden should be on the person who wishes
to disclose to justify to the patient, to an ethics committee, and per-
haps in court that the disclosure was necessary and met the commit-
tee's test."41
And finally, two cases have already examined questions about
whether physicians should be required to disclose genetic risks to the
relatives of their patients. In Pate v. Threlkel,4 2 Florida's Supreme
39. See Renzi v. Morrison, 618 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. App. 1993) (imposing liability on wife's
psychiatrist who voluntarily testified on husband's behalf in divorce proceeding); Hobbs v.
Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio App. 1994) (imposing liability when nurse, who had been
instructed by physician to call 21 year old patient, instead told patient's mother that pa-
tient was pregnant and had sought information about abortion); Humphers v. First Inter-
state Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985). But seeJones v. Baisch, 40 F.3d 252 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that disclosure of patient's genital herpes was not protected by Nebraska's privacy
statute because facts were true and that there was no intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the behavior was not sufficiendy egregious).
40. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDI-
TIONS: THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING,
AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 44 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
41. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIVISION OF HEALTH POLICY, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 23
(1994) [hereinafter COMM. ON GENETIC RISKS]; see also American Society of Human Genet-
ics Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure, Professional Disclosure of Familial Ge-
netic Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 474 (1998).
42. 661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
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Court held that a physician should have warned his patient who had
medullary carcinoma of the thyroid that her relatives might also be at
risk of developing the same disease. 43 The court went on to say, how-
ever, that:
Our holding should not be read to require the physician to
warn the patient's children of the disease. In most instances
the physician is prohibited from disclosing the patient's med-
ical condition to others except with the patient's permission.
Moreover, the patient ordinarily can be expected to pass on
the warning. To require the physician to seek out and warn
various members of the patient's family would often be diffi-
cult or impractical and would place too heavy a burden upon
the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any circumstances
in which the physician has a duty to warn of a genetically
transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the
patient.
4
An appellate court in New Jersey reached a markedly different
result in Safer v. Pack.45 In this case, the plaintiffs father was diag-
nosed with colon cancer in 1956 and ultimately died in 1964.46 The
plaintiff was diagnosed with colon cancer in 1990 and sued her fa-
ther's physician's estate, alleging that the physician should have told
her that she was at increased risk of developing colon cancer.47
There, the court, relying primarily on notions of foreseeability and
analogies to the infectious disease and mental illness cases, held that a
duty to warn of avertible risk from genetic causes, by defini-
tion a matter of familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to
serve the interests of justice. Further, it is appropriate ...
that the duty be seen as owed not only to the patient himself
but that it also 'extends beyond the interests of a patient to
members of the immediate family of the patient who may be
adversely affected by a breach of that duty.' ... We need not
decide, in the present posture of this case, how, precisely,
that duty is to be discharged, especially with respect to young
children who may be at risk, except to require that reason-
able steps be taken to assure that the information reaches
43. See id. at 282.
44. Id.
45. 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J.
1996).
46. See id. at 1189-90.
47. See id. at 1190.
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those likely to be affected or is made available for their
benefit.
48
This court went on to recognize that problems may arise when pa-
tients expressly oppose disclosure, saying that:
This case implicates serious and conflicting medical, social
and legal policies, . . . Some such policy considerations may
need to be addressed in ultimately resolving this case. For
example, if evidence is produced that will permit the jury to
find that Dr. Pack received instructions from his patient not
to disclose details of the illness or the fact of genetic risk, the
court will be required to determine whether, as a matter of
law, there are or ought to be any limits on physician-patient
confidentiality, especially after the patient's death where a
risk of harm survives the patient, as in the case of genetic
consequences.49
While not resolving this issue, this court clearly felt that the patient's
wishes may appropriately be overridden in some circumstances.
This contradictory position articulated in scholarly and judicial
opinion creates substantial confusion about what legal rules should
govern the physician who knows that his patient's relatives may have a
mutation that predisposes them to develop a disease that could be
ameliorated or cured by early intervention. These questions could
arise in a variety of situations.
Going back to the opening hypothetical, suppose Dr. Smart had
simply called Sue when he first diagnosed Tom's colon cancer without
mentioning anything to Tom first - assuming that Dr. Smart knew
that Tom had blood relatives and where they were without asking him.
Tom could argue that he had expected that information about him
would be kept confidential, perhaps as a matter of express agreement
but more likely as a general expectation regarding the practice of
medicine in this country. The primary problem, if Dr. Smart were
simply to call Tom's relatives, would be his failure to ask Tom whether
he agreed with the disclosure. Ethically, Dr. Smart's actions would not
be acceptable under the guidelines set forth by the President's Com-
mission50 nor the IOM Committee.51 More generally, spreading infor-
mation about patients without their consent simply is bad medical
practice. From a legal perspective, Tom would have several courses of
action available to him. He could report Dr. Smart to the state medi-
48. Id. at 1192 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 1193.
50. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 40, at 44.
51. See COMM. ON GENETIC RISKS, supra note 41, at 23.
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cal licensing board for possible censure.52 However, it seems quite
unlikely that the medical board would revoke or suspend Dr. Smart's
license for this sort of disclosure.5 3 He could also sue Dr. Smart for
damages, alleging that the information disclosed was private. Among
the elements that a court might consider in such a claim is whether a
reasonable person would be upset by the disclosure of information
about genetic risk.54 The outcome of such an inquiry is uncertain.55
Dr. Smart might argue in defense that he had a duty or at least a
privilege to prevent harm. Yet, most of the cases that recognize such
duties or privileges can readily be distinguished. The infectious dis-
ease cases are premised on the notion that it is important to protect
otherwise healthy persons from being made sick by a vector that is
entirely external to themselves. 6 Moreover, states regard the contain-
ment of infectious diseases as a uniquely important goal and impose
rigorous reporting requirements on physicians and permit a host of
interventions by public health officials.57 This public policy is often
cited to support imposing liability on physicians who fail to warn third
parties about the risk of contagion.58 By contrast, states do not re-
quire providers to report either environmental hazards, such as the
one at issue in the case of Mark and Jack," or genetic risks. Even in
the absence of a reporting requirement, one could cite the strong
public mandate to try to ameliorate environmental hazards to support
imposing liability on those who fail to warn of such risks. 60 No such
52. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-22, 78 (1995).
53. See id. at 79 (explaining that disciplinary actions are usually limited for immoral
actions and that the grounds for professional discipline must "have a rational connection
with applicant's fitness or capacity to practice").
54. See, e.g., Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1255-57 (Kan. 1985).
55. The elements needed to establish a legal claim for breach of privacy are quite com-
plex. See id. at 1254-57.
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Michie 1997) (permitting physicians' disclo-
sure of patient's contagious disease without liability unless disclosed with malice); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §2101 (1) (Consol. 1998) ("[E]very physician shall immediately give notice of
every case of communicable disease..."); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §110 (1997) (mandating
that physicians and other health officials report specified diseases).
58. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa.
1990) (four to three judge opinion citing state public health laws requiring physicians to
report communicable disease cases).
59. To elaborate a little further on the case of Mark and Jack, suppose that Mark had
consulted with an environmental engineer who discovered the toxic fumes and advised
Mark about how to remedy the problem. No case law supports a duty of the engineer to
warn Mark's neighbors.
60. This is yet another area in which there is a rather broad public mandate for govern-
mental intervention as is evidenced by the wide array of laws to protect against environ-
mental hazards. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1997); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1997).
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consensus exists regarding the state's role in minimizing the health
consequences of genetic risks.61 We can certainly ask whether the re-
porting requirements should be broadened beyond infectious dis-
eases to include other sources of ill health, but for purposes of this
analysis, the critical difference is that such statutory requirements
have not yet been enacted.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California6 2 and its progeny also
can be distinguished because disclosure in those cases is justified in
order to prevent assault and murder.63 There may be general agree-
ment that people probably ought to warn their relatives about shared
genetic risks, but failure to do so is not a crime. Broad public policies
favoring public and private intervention to contain infectious diseases
or to prevent mentally ill individuals from assaulting others64 underlie
imposing liability on physicians who fail to warn those who are put at
risk by their patients. Similar public policies do not exist for genetic
risks. Indeed, the overwhelming trend in current policy is to try to
ensure the privacy of genetic information, not to require its
disclosure.65
One is left then only with the court's assertion in Safer v. Pack that
the foreseeability of the risk was sufficient to warrant requiring physi-
cians to warn their patients' relatives about genetic risks.6 6 The diffi-
culty with this position is that foreseeability of harm, while important
to the definition of duty, is not the only element in one's duty to warn.
The existence of broader, well-recognized public policy bases for
Tarasoff and the infectious disease cases is an important factor that
61. For one of the most thoughtful recent discussions of this topic, see generally Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, Translating Advances in Human Genetics Into
Public Health Action: A Strategic Plan (October 1, 1997) (unpublished document, on file
with the author).
62. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
63. See Rocca v. Southern Hills Counselling Center, 671 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ind. App.
1996) (reading exception pernitting disclosure of death threats to potential victim into a
statute protecting confidentiality of mental health records).
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65. Although most of the bills that seek to protect genetic information are driven by
fear that this information will be used to disadvantage patients, primarily in access to insur-
ance or employment, they often contain quite broad language limiting disclosure. See, e.g.,
The Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R.
306, 105th Cong. (1997), and the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of
1997, S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997). Numerous states are considering or have enacted laws
that limit disclosure and use of genetic information. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-2701-8 (1998);
Karen Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches, 23
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 313-16 (1995).
66. SeeSaferv. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1191-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert denied
683 A.2d 1163 (NJ. 1996).
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does not apply to the genetics cases. Moreover, the Safer court failed
to give adequate attention to the importance of protecting confidenti-
ality in the delivery of health care. Confidentiality is not and should
not be protected all the time, but neither should it be freely abro-
gated. The decision in Saferis a real departure from previous jurispru-
dence, and the deficits in that court's analysis make it too weak a reed
on which to base a far reaching duty to disclose genetic risks.
Changing the hypothetical a little, we assume that:
Dr. Smart told Tom that his relatives were at significant risk of de-
veloping colon cancer. Dr. Smart recommended that Tom talk with
his relatives, but Tom refused even after significant urging.6 7
Although Tom insisted that Dr. Smart not tell his kin, Dr. Smart
was so concerned about the risk faced by Tom's relatives that he
talked with them anyway.
This hypothetical presents something of an irony. On the one hand,
this is exactly the situation in which the President's Commission
would say that Dr. Smart's disclosures are ethically privileged.6" On
the other, there is something particularly troubling about ignoring
Tom's explicit request that information about his condition not be
shared. Talking with Tom's relatives in this case would be a direct
slap in Tom's face. It would be hard to imagine that Tom would ever
feel free in the future to talk openly with Dr. Smart or any other physi-
cian. News of this sort of blatant disregard of Tom's wishes could un-
dermine the trust of other patients as well. Is imposing a duty to
override patients' objections in such cases worth this price, particu-
larly in the absence of other public policy favoring disclosure?
The problems addressed in Pate and Safer are not unwanted dis-
closure but rather failure to warn.69 In both these cases, the problem
probably is failure of a physician to recognize the presence of genetic
risk. To begin, it is important to ask just exactly what doctors should
know. Medicine is early in its understanding of the genetic contribu-
tions to complex diseases, and it seems quite likely that the mythic
reasonably prudent practitioner would not have known about the ge-
netic risks in either of these cases. 7' The evidence is overwhelming
67. Usually, however, patients generally say yes, knowing that that is what their physi-
cians want to hear or perhaps even fully intending to talk, but then patients, for whatever
reason, do not tell their relatives.
68. See generally PRsIE)u-r's COMM'N, supra note 40.
69. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
70. Although familial adenomatosis had been described in 1956, knowing about this
disease surely was not part of the standard of care for a general surgeon at that time or for
many years thereafter.
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that even now, most practitioners are woefully ignorant about genet-
ics, and massive efforts are underway to try to increase their level of
knowledge.
Again returning to our basic case, let us assume for purposes of
discussion that Tom's physician either knew or should have known
about the risk that Tom's relatives shared a mutation that would pre-
dispose them to develop cancer. It seems obvious in 1998 that Tom's
doctor ought to discuss this with him. But what legal doctrine re-
quires a conversation between doctor and patient about the genetic
risks faced by relatives, and that would support the award of damages
to the relatives were that information not conveyed?
The most basic law governing physician-patient communication is
the doctrine of informed consent which requires that patients be pro-
vided with the information needed to enable them to make reasoned
decisions about their own health care. That this doctrine is directed
to the patient's own health is evidenced by its origin in the ancient law
of battery, which imposed liability for unconsented touching of one
person by another. 71 Here, by contrast, we are talking about disclo-
sures that might affect the health care of others. Enabling Tom to
help his relatives exceeds even the most generous boundaries of in-
formed consent.
The wrongful birth cases 72 also do not support a requirement
that physicians talk with their patients about the genetic risks that
might be shared by relatives. The complaints in those cases are that
the prospective parents were denied information relevant to their own
reproductive decision making.73 For those cases to be helpful to
Tom's relatives, they would have to permit damages to be awarded to
the siblings of the prospective parents who argue that their reproduc-
tive decision making was also impaired by the doctor's failure to talk
with his patients. The wrongful birth cases do not reach that far. Ulti-
mately, the law generally does not require physicians to provide their
patients with information that would enable their patients to help
71. SeeJAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, 49-52 (1984).
72. In these cases, parents who have a child with a genetic or congenital disorder seek
damages alleging that had they known of their risk of having a child with that disorder,
they would have avoided procreation altogether, used donor gametes, or had prenatal di-
agnosis and terminated the pregnancy. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital,
512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
73. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 694 (alleging that physician negligently diagnosed and
failed to accurately advise parents of the risk of bearing a hemophiliac child); Schroeder, 432
A.2d at 835 (alleging that physician negligently failed to diagnose parents' first child with
cystic fibrosis and, thus, deprived parents of ability to make informed choice about
whether to have a second child).
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others. As a result, even the decision in Pate is a significant, and per-
haps unsupportable, extension of the law.7 4
But let us assume that the law does require physicians to inform
patients about the possibility that their relatives might share their ge-
netic risks. Should a negligent failure by Dr. Smart to warn Tom
about the possible risks faced by his relatives support a claim by Sue
against the doctor? Such a claim would pose formidable problems of
causation. Sue would have to show that Tom would have warned her
and that she would have sought medical care in time to avert her risk.
But beyond that, if it is correct that physicians should not have legally
enforceable duties directly to warn individuals who are not their pa-
tients about genetic risks, then they should not be subjected to this
sort of indirect liability either.7
5
TV. CONCLUSION
In sum, then, while physicians should talk with their patients
about genetic risks and patients, in most instances, should discuss
these risks with their relatives, neither patients nor their physicians
should be legally responsible for warning family members about ge-
netic risks. That result may seem harsh, but imposing liability would
represent a major expansion of the law that is unsupported by current
public policies and would wreak havoc on the protection of confiden-
tiality and on the physician's focus on the patient before her. These
goals are perhaps tattered, but still important in our health care
system.
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (physician should have warned his patient
to inform her relatives of risk of developing same disease).
75. Cf, D'Amico v. Delliquadri, 683 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). In D'Amico, a
woman could not obtain damages from her boyfriend's physician because he allegedly
failed to warn her that the boyfriend's genital warts were contagious. Id. at 816-17. The
court's analysis relied in substantial part on the physician's inability to testify due to the
boyfriend's privilege. See id.
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